This paper analyses how Ugandan army commanders have mobilised transborder economic networks to exploit economic opportunities in eastern DRC during the military intervention of the Ugandan People's Defence Force (UPDF) in Congo's wars (1996Á97; 1998Á2003). These transborder networks are the starting point of our evaluation of the informal political structures and networks linking Uganda's political centre to Congo's war complex. While it is often claimed that military entrepreneurismalism in the DRC has undermined political stability in Uganda, we argue that the activities of Ugandan military entrepreneurs and networks under their control were an integral part of Uganda's governance regime. Crucial to the development of this entrepreneurialism was the existence of pre-war transborder networks of economic exchange that were connecting Congo to eastern African markets. Military control over these highly informalised networks facilitated UPDF commanders' access to Congo's resources. Rather than operating as privatised sources of accumulation, these military shadow networks were directly linked to the inner circles of the Ugandan regime.
In December 2008, the Ugandan People's Defence Force (UPDF) entered the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and launched an attack on the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), which was hiding in Garamba National Park in northern DRC, just across the border from Sudan. This military strike, called Operation Lightning Thunder, aimed at dislodging and ending the military activity of the armed group. Two years later, however, the LRA remains at large and is held responsible for killing and abducting hundreds of Congolese civilians. UPDF forces still in the area have not been able to stop the LRA from terrorising the local population and have become part of a highly complex local security context.
Operation Lighting Thunder was not the first UPDF military operation on Congolese territory. 1 In 1996, Uganda was part of a regional coalition that was officially born out of growing security threats from Rwandan Hutu rebels and Ugandan rebel groups that were operating from their Congolese bases and that were receiving assistance from the Mobutu regime. In the north-eastern parts of the DRC, UPDF troops offered considerable support to the Kabila's rebel movement that eventually removed Mobutu from power. In support of the Rwanda led military operation against the Kabila regime, two years later, UPDF troops again entered the DRC. This time, things did not go as smoothly as two years before. A growing number of sources started reporting on the involvement of high-ranking UPDF officials or ''entrepreneurs of insecurity '' 2 in what could be called acts of ''military entrepreneurialism''. 3 Hardly three years after the beginning of the second Congolese war (1998Á2003), senior UPDF officers, linked to Congolese militias and international commercial networks, were singled out by a UN Panel of Experts report on the illegal exploitation of resources. The head of the Ugandan expeditionary corps in the DRC, General James Kazini, the Chief of Military Intelligence, Colonel Noble Mayombo, Uganda's presidential adviser on Congo, Col. Kahinda Otafiire, President Museveni's brother and UPDF, Lieutenant General (Ret) Salim Saleh his wife Jovia Akwandwanaho, and Colonel Peter Kerim were all named as key players of what was referred to by the same UN Panel of Experts report as an ''elite network'' 4 plundering Congo's natural resources. In most explanations of Uganda's military involvement in the Congolese conflict, these networks have taken central stage but yet have hardly been defined. Prunier 5 mentions phenomena of ''corruption'', Clark talks about ''mercenary activities'', 6 Raeymaekers about ''privatised networks of individual army officials, local warlords and international enterprises''. 7 Many scholars have explained these actors or structures as being part of non-state forms of organisation, and usually focus on their ''privatised'', ''informal'', ''illicit'' or ''criminal'' behaviour. Networks are considered as predatory forces and socially destructive forms of organisation, undermining political stability, the functioning of state institutions, and economic efficiency. 8 Other authors though have argued that these personalised networks can shape political processes and political authority, 9 particularly in Africa's war-torn societies or fragile states. This article wants to document and contextualise the role played by UPDF forces in the informal political structures and networks linking Uganda's political centre to Congo's war complex.
This analysis is based on three main arguments. First, an historical perspective reveals that this informal transborder (military) entrepreneurialism is not a new phenomenon. Even if in this case it is directly linked to a recent external military deployment, it relies on pre-existing and pre-war exchange networks between Congo and Uganda. It is not exclusively linked to the war context or to the deployment of foreign troops even if this conflict setting has temporarily maximised profits and has added fluidity in the transformation of the network leaderships. Second, these networks are often too hastily qualified as privatised networks. In the Ugandan case, these networks were embedded in the first circles of the political and military power of the Ugandan regime and were intricately linked to the state structure and administration. These ''structures of opportunity'' included formal and informal elements and could best be described as militarised shadow networks developing a clear interconnectedness between public and private logics, as well as between state and non-state actors. Third, reflection needs to be made on the perpetuation of these networks within the Ugandan state, since the end of the Congolese war. It needs to be evaluated if these shadow networks have undermined or rather strengthened Uganda's state system. The main question here is whether these networks of accumulation could be considered as autonomously operating or in the end being integrated in the political system, and if and how these networks have transformed the nature of Uganda's state and ruling regime.
In this paper, we will focus first on the pre-war economic environment and its linkage between local, regional and global networks. We will then offer an ethnography of actors involved through the trajectory of some UPDF commanders, their interactions and strategies to penetrate and benefit from the exploitation of these networks. We will then evaluate the extent to which Uganda's military intervention in eastern DRC in return has shaped and reshaped existing patterns of transborder economic exchange and internal political processes in Uganda. Finally, the capacity of these networks to perpetuate themselves in non-war situations will be analysed. It will be shown that most network members have been recycled into the state-apparatus after the Congo war. As will be illustrated, there are even indications that they have started playing a prominent role in Uganda's oil business, which is still in the early stages of its development.
The role of pre-war economic networks
A historical perspective on transborder trade in UgandaÁCongo's borderland reveals the embeddedness of UPDF's military entrepreneurialism during DRC's wars in localised and transborder networks. These pre-war networks facilitated the development of a ''military-commercial nexus'' 10 in UgandaÁCongo's borderland during the UPDF's involvement in the Congolese wars. Already during the 1980s, porous borders 11 and weak local state institutions 12 facilitated the development of transborder informal networks of economic exchange in this area. While destroying the formal economy of Zaire, these networks used state power to instrumentalise the potentialities of informal trade through a subversion of the state regulatory authority. 13 From the early 1980s on, cross-border economic transactions drastically increased, both in volume and in their illicit character, and consolidated the emergence of a vast regional network of informal trade that became ''the means by which seemingly disastrous national economies managed to keep going''. 14 But even prior to this expansion of informal trade, illicit transborder activities were already flourishing in the region. In 1963, an agent of the Congolese tax administration reported the illicit exportation of agricultural commodities by caravans of porters on the North KivuÁUganda border. And in 1964, the illegal exportation of diamonds from the Congo was estimated to represent 81% of the official production. 15 The expansion of these informal activities is mainly related to the liberalisation of the production, exploitation and commercialisation of a number of key minerals in 1982. Where official international treaties in the Great Lakes Region failed to create regional economic integration, unrecorded cross-border trade resulted in unofficial market integration beyond the state limits. As MacGaffey concludes, ''it was partly owing to the ingenuity of local entrepreneurs that (. . .) Zaire was able to ward off harsh blows of a decade-long flight of foreign capital and cuts in economic assistance''. 16 Not only local entrepreneurs profited from these smuggling activities: ''private businesses, transportation companies, and tax-collecting bureaucracies throughout the region benefited significantly from the informal sector and the income opportunities it provided''. 17 In resource rich provinces, hundreds of private small-scale exploitation structures were created and absorbed by local and foreign networks. Also in Orientale province, gold production and commercialisation increasingly fell under control of informal traders (mainly of Nande and Hema origins) and became the backbone of a transborder trade that was connecting Ugandan and Congolese markets.
Even though violence was already part of the management of these pre-existing networks, during the Congolese wars, these networks' modes of exploitation and commercialisation became entirely militarised. After their arrival in 1996, UPDF commanders discovered a veritable ''Mini Eldorado'' in the eastern parts of Zaire. 18 In Kisangani and Ituri, both flourishing centres of informal diamond and gold trade, UPDF officers started exploiting Congolese minerals for their own benefit. Initially, smuggling activities of the UPDF were mainly organised on an individual basis. UPDF commanders quickly learned though how to turn their military control into a profitable enterprise by developing a lucrative ''modus vivendi'' with Congolese business communities in Orientale Province. Local Congolese traders, even if they did not benefit directly from the war, could continue their economic activity or could even profit from it if they were able to reach a position in the military trade mechanisms. But also Ugandan traders took advantage of UPDF's presence in the DRC and were offered free passage to sell goods such as soap, metal roof sheeting, fuel, canned food and clothing to the Congolese consumer market in exchange for natural resources and agricultural produce. The fact that UPDF's military intervention in 1997 was a lucrative enterprise also for the Ugandan economy was illustrated by the country's gold exports, which in 1997 skyrocketed to the second largest source of export income.
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The dynamics of military entrepreneurialism 20 There exists some disagreement between different authors on the initial motivation of Uganda's intervention in the DRC, yet it can hardly be doubted that security objectives soon were also diverted or manipulated for financial and economic stakes. The economic benefits of these military entrepreneurs brought into light the lucrative dynamic of the Congolese conflict. It could be argued that these individuals, assured of their political position at home, continuously exploited a context of insecurity in the DRC as a source of private income. For several observers, these strategies point at an informalisation of politics and the military in Uganda. 21 Eriksen even states that ''because the regime is politically dependent on support from the army, it has been unable or unwilling to control the behaviour of its armed forces in Congo and to prevent private profiteering''. 22 Realities on the ground suggest a more sophisticated reading. The UPDF developed a strategy of politico-economic and military control in the DRC that went beyond private gain. The generated resources were used, paradoxically, for the strengthening of the domestic political regime, 23 even if it can be argued that the private agendas of individual UPDF commanders at some point inflicted with this very objective.
The rise of these military entrepreneurs of insecurity evolved as the fluctuating relationships with the central Congolese government dictated. First and foremost, during the first war Uganda and Rwanda concluded an alliance with Kabila to get access to local networks of economic control, particularly in the mining sector. After Kabila took power in May 1997, economic relations between both countries intensified, with several visits of Ugandan delegations of businessmen and government officials to the DRC and a formalisation of cooperation through a number of bilateral agreements, including a railway that would connect Ugandan and Congolese markets but was never realised. Both countries also concluded an agreement on military cooperation. In April 1998, an arrangement that allowed the UPDF to conduct operations in eastern DRC against several Ugandan militias was formalised with a Protocol on Security along the Common Border. 24 In spring 1998, the UgandanÁCongolese relationship started to deteriorate though. Prior to the start of the second Congolese war, the Congolese Minister of Economy and Oil, Pierre Victor Mpoyo, caused a heavy blast in the relations between Congo and Uganda when accusing Ugandan government officials of warlord practices and their involvement in the smuggling of gold, diamond and timber from north-eastern DRC. 25 Inspired by the fears of a Rwanda led coup d'état and in search for a local power base, on July 27, 1998, the Kabila regime urged all foreign troops to leave the country within two weeks. This decision was the final trigger to a second RwandanÁUgandan military adventure in the DRC. Six days after Rwandan and Ugandan troops were expelled, the same troops re-entered the country.
During this second Ugandan intervention (1998Á2003), the exploitation of Congolese resources became much more systematic, and trading networks, linking mining centres in Congo's hinterland to international traders, drastically expanded. The patterns of military commercialism evolved from a parasitic structure of military business and petty thieves, already active during the first war but also in northern Uganda for example, to a paroxysmal entrepreneurial logic of conflict economy linked with international legal as well as illegal and criminal networks. 26 At their (re)arrival in the DRC, the Ugandan expeditionary corps tried to take control over trade and business in the territories they controlled. A main target was the exploitation of natural and strategic resources (gold, coltan, diamonds, and cassiterite) but also timber, coffee, ivory, and vanilla. To consolidate control and guarantee continuous production, several alternative structures were put in place. In the Kilo Moto area (Ituri District), the old mining guards of the Zairian state company were replaced by UPDF controlled elements, while individual recruits started monitoring access to the mining sites by guarding bridges and strategic roadblocks and by levying taxes from local miners and traders. In addition to the export of natural resources, the Ugandan military controlled imports and distribution of goods from Entebbe (beer, cigarettes, sodas, toilet papers, etc.) around Gbadolite (northern DRC) and Bunia (Ituri).
This economic production was largely generated through individuals closely linked to the Ugandan regime (including a number of ''Historicals'', i.e. politicalmilitary figures associated to Museveni's National Resistance Army from the first years in the bush at the beginning of the 1980s and then at the core of the decision making-process in the Ugandan military and State), as well as members of the First family, sometimes via straw societies or dummy companies. The case of LieutenantColonel Jet Mwebaze serves well to illustrate this. In September 1998, Mwebaze died in a plane crash in the Rwenzori Mountains, along Uganda's western border with the DRC. It turned out that the plane carried a million dollars in cash, which was going to be used for the acquisition of a considerable amount of gold in the Ituri district. In all likelihood, Mwebaze and his business partners Á a group of gold traders employed by Major-General Salim Saleh's Efforte Corporation Á were hoping to take advantage of the fact that their load of gold would be classified as military cargo and would therefore not be subject to the payment of customs duties. 27 The existence of this type of networks (which involved Congolese, Rwandese and Ugandan political leaders, military commanders, businessmen, leaders of armed groups, local administrators and international commercialisation networks) would be presented as an illustration of warfare aimed at maximising profit through military control over resources and based on a partnership between military commanders and businessmen. Through the control of the pre-war chain of transactions and intermediaries between mining centres and urban trading posts, or through direct exploitation of mining centres, top-ranking officers from Rwanda and Uganda could lay their hands on most of the local mining production. Pricefixing, forced monopoly, and the direct or indirect control over customs helped to consolidate a total control of the exploitation of resources. Different financial networks had to back this system and to guarantee the financing of the war efforts, while new networks of transportation, increasingly based on air transport, eased the exchange of goods with the Congolese interior.
This phenomenon questions the links between violence, politics and economy. If in the first Congolese conflict the war economy remained an epiphenomenon and helped the Ugandan regime to finance the war, in the second one, the economic component of the conflict became a major dynamic of the conflict. The war was no longer a military conquest but a position war in which mining sites, forests as well as roads and airports became the main military objectives. The military, rebel armed groups and militias ensured the perpetuation of these networks by maintaining insecurity and promoting the emergence of militarised local big men.
A number of key figures of the Ugandan regime played a crucial role in this economic exploitation. Particularly the careers of James Kazini and Salim Saleh are symbolic for the rise of a new class of ''entrepreneurs of insecurity''. General James Kazini was a key actor not only in DRC's war economy but also in the manipulation of local conflict dynamics. At the end of August 1998, he was pointed out as the principal holder of timber looted from the stockpiles of Amex-bois and La Forestiere. In January 1999, Kazini, who was by then closely associated with Congolese rebel leader Jean-Pierre Bemba, confiscated hundreds of tons of coffee stocks from Bumba, Lisala, Bosonzo, Binga and Mindembo. 28 This traffic required large redistribution and network offshoots, including international commercialisation channels, ''comptoirs d'achat'' and intermediaries. In Equateur and Province Orientale, James Kazini constituted the link between UPDF officers and the Congolese leaders of armed groups. As UPDF Overall Commander in the DRC from 1998 to 2000, he became a close collaborator of Congolese rebel leaders Á Mbusa Nyamwisi, John Tibasiima, Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie-Mouvement de Libération (RCD-ML), Roger Lumbala, Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie-National (RCD-National) and Jean-Pierre Bemba, Mouvement pour la Libération du Congo (MLC) Á all of whom facilitated his illegal dealings in diamonds, coltan, timber, counterfeit currency, gold and coffee.
Another crucial personality and one of the most famous representatives of these military entrepreneurs was Salim Saleh, President Museveni's brother. Endlessly diversifying his activities, he developed a resource accumulation strategy that skilfully mixed civilian and military business, charity and ''legitimate corruption'', as well as national development and international capitalism. 29 In 1999Á2000, Salim Saleh opened a trading post for the commercialisation of gold and diamonds in Kisangani and controlled a number of aviation companies that operated commercial flights from Uganda to the DRC. At least two Ugandan airlines claimed a quasi-monopoly on the flights to Equateur and Oriental province: Air Alexander belonging to Salim Saleh's wife (Jovia Akandwanaho), and Uganda Air Cargo that operated in Gemena, Basankasu, Isiro and Buta. A third company that is often mentioned is Air Navette, which was hired regularly by Salim Saleh and the leader of MLC (Jean-Pierre Bemba), and operated in Gbadolite, Gemena, Kisangani and Bunia. The Saleh couple, together with Kazini, was also linked to Trinity Investment, a company officially managed by the leader of the RCD-ML, specialised in the exploitation of timber in Ituri and North Kivu and that transported among others agricultural products, wood and cattle on behalf of the Gegere families from Bunia to Kampala exempt of UPDF toll barriers and export taxes. Another society, Sagricof, was discretely controlled by Col. Peter Kerim, who was in charge of combat operations in the Rwenzori mountains, and K. Otafiire, and was associated to Trinity Investment.
But these military entrepreneurs also relied on contacts with international business associates. An interesting example is the structure of control around La Conmet and the Ituri Gold Mining Company, two companies run by the Russian business couple Valentina Piskunova and Anatoly Piskunov. During the second Congo war, La Conmet was based in Butembo, sourcing coltan from rebel-held areas and selling the minerals to clients in South Africa, Kazakhstan and Germany. There are strong indications that the company enjoyed the protection of Salim Saleh and Mbusa Nyamwisi, the then leader of the RCD-ML rebel movement, 30 but Museveni's brother has always denied these allegations. 31 As for the Ituri Gold Mining Company, this entity is known to have organised an exploratory trip in the Ituri district in the beginning of 1999, in order to investigate the options for setting up gold transactions between Congo and Uganda. The mission received the approval of the leadership of the RCD-ML and attracted businessmen from various backgrounds, including Daniel Tiomkin, a Ukrainian entrepreneur living in South Africa, and Abdul Karangwa, a Rwandan businessman previously belonging to the inner circle of Laurent-Désiré Kabila. 32 The reconfiguration of domestic political power As stated above, key to the success of these militarised economic activities was the existence of pre-war transborder networks of economic and social exchange that could be mobilised and exploited by new coalitions of army commanders, rebel leaders, traders and local authorities. The manipulation of the CongoleseÁUgandan borderland during the Congolese wars offers an interesting example of how unregulated economic activities can be moments of reconfiguration of local regulation and reconstitution of public authority and state power. While political scientists and historians have paid a lot of attention to how states have tried to deal with their borderlands, far less attention has been given to how these borderlands deal with states 33 and how they reshape state authority. Nevertheless, as is illustrated by recent developments in the UgandanÁCongolese borderland, these zones can also be understood as regions of inventiveness, creating their own institutional arrangements and regulatory regimes that eventually (re)define their relationship with the central state. 34 Uganda's military presence in the DRC was largely based and depended on close collaboration between UPDF commanders and Congolese rebel leaders, traders and political elites. In order to consolidate its military position, the Ugandan regime concluded security arrangements with local elites that went much further than territorial and border control but also comprised private business deals. The UPDF made business in developing a dual economy of protection and extortion. One strategy was the enforced payment of tributes or protection fees by private traders doing business in the zones the UPDF militarily controlled. Rather than investing directly in mining activities, they co-opted experienced, and well-connected preexisting diamond dealers. The occupying armies granted contracts or concessions to private businesses, and issued permits and safe conduits to facilitate private business in return for the payment of protection taxes to the UPDF or to allied rebel leaders. In the end, new arrangements restructured or replaced pre-war networks, reinforced the link between local businessmen and international commercial partners and instigated a new process of regional economic integration, with businessmen, traders, local bureaucracies, tax administrations and military leaderships as its main actors.
The outcomes of these arrangements caused additional contestation on a local level though, while the UPDF never had the capacity to fully control local power struggles. This forced its commanders to continuously adapt to changing contexts and identify alternative partners and alternative strategies to protect their business interests. The UPDF involvement in the Ituri conflict illustrates very well the opportunities, challenges and limits of military entrepreneurialism. Between 1999 and 2003, this district, which shares borders with Uganda and Sudan, witnessed one of the most severe episodes of the Congolese war as a result of the exploitation, by local and regional actors, of a deeply rooted local conflict over access to land, economic opportunity and political power. Local antagonism, which in origin centred on control over vital livelihoods including land, was skilfully manipulated by UPDF commanders for the development of alternative transborder networks. One of the key players was Gen. James Kazini, who understood the benefits of an alliance with the local Hema community. In 1999, a number of Hema landowners threatened to evict Lendu farmers from their land, based on fraudulently acquired property titles. Revenge acts by local Lendu leaders led to a first series of violent clashes. Hema landowners started recruiting defence groups that soon acquired the support of some UPDF units, who started acting as private security guards for Hema elites. This security arrangement became the backbone of an emerging Hema politicoeconomic power base. Hema traders started operating under the protection of the UPDF and succeeded in expanding their commercial enterprise, which ultimately connected local markets to Ugandan and international traders. This economic partnership was further consolidated on the politico-administrative level with the appointment by Gen. Kazini of Adèle Lotsove Mugisa, a Hema, as the governor of the newly created province Kabale-Ituri. Kazini's decision met with fierce resistance from the governor of Orientale province, who technically still had control over Ituri. The creation of a separate province was a personal decision taken by Kazini as part of a larger strategy to install an alternative power structure under his protection, which was relying on Hema networks. But for non-Hema communities, this was a clear move to exclude them from the local decision-making process and transborder trading networks.
Another illustration of how the Ugandan intervention in the DRC not only created economic opportunities to members of the Ugandan politico-military elite but also allowed actors operating in the UgandanÁCongolese borderland to reposition themselves in local and regional markets is the case of Aru-Mahagi. Based in Ituri's border region with Uganda, this area during part of the war was under control of the ''Forces Armées du Peuple Congolais'' (FAPC), which was led by Jérô me Kakwavu. Jérô me, who received support from the Ugandan regime, had a particular interest in controlling border towns such as Aru and Ariwara, as historically these were the centres of an informal transborder trade that was connecting West Nile to north-eastern DRC. 35 As transit points for gold and timber, these towns had a considerable economic value. In collaboration with a number of key businessmen on both sides of the border, Jérô me's rebel organisation put in place a sophisticated system that protected the interests of ''a closely knit network, including selected officers of FAPC, members of Fédération des Entreprises du Congo, Ugandan businessmen, Ugandan officials and internationally linked commercial entities''. 36 The border was essential: a customs revenue apparatus was installed that had to replace the pre-war state bureaucracy and to guarantee the payment of taxes by all traders importing goods to the DRC or exporting resources to Uganda. Since the import and export taxes imposed by the FAPC were significantly lower than the official government taxes and the taxes in other areas in eastern DRC, the Aru/Ariwara areas developed into what Titeca has described as an ''African Monaco'', that is, a tax paradise attracting traders from places far away from the border. 37 Moreover, close Congolese and Ugandan business associates could profit from a preferential pre-financing system, which in return for the payment of an agreed amount of money exempted them from paying custom duties. The arrangement between the rebels and traders, which was developed in collaboration with the local branch of the Fédération des Entreprises du Congo (FEC), included that goods could be imported or exported without the payment of taxes during a specific period of time.
The developing politico-economic enterprises in the UgandanÁCongolese borderland soon proved to have their limits though. Firstly, economic stakes generated substantial competition, both within the UPDF and between Ugandan and Rwandan army commanders. It is generally believed that Kazini and Joviah Akwandwanaho's decision to take over the informal diamond trade in eastern Congo marked the beginning of the so-called ''Kisangani wars'' between the Ugandan and Rwandan armies that would cause a serious blow to UgandanÁRwandan relations. As part of an attempt to expand its sphere of control in northern and north-eastern DRC, the Ugandan regime preferred to mobilise a number of proxies, including Bemba's MLC but also parts of the RCD. This rebel movement eventually split into a number of factions, leading to a military fragmentation and the carving up of the rebel-held territories in different zones of control. But also between UPDF units, tensions rose mainly because of Kazini's strategic choices. At a certain point, these standing differences even resulted in an open confrontation between two opposing UPDF units in Ituri. 38 Secondly, the UPDF was never in control of local realities, partly because of the complexity of local conflicts but also because of a lack of political leadership over the expeditionary corps, which eventually led to an open rift within the UPDF itself. Not long after the creation of the province of Kabale-Ituri, Thomas Lubanga Á the nephew of administrator Lotsove Á established the UPC (''Union des Patriotes Congolais''), which successfully took control over Bunia in August 2002. From there, it instituted its own governance apparatus and structures of control, which forced other ethnic groups to establish their own armed groups. Initially supported by General Kazini in pursuing its exclusivist agenda, the UPC's shift to Rwanda urged other UPDF officers to develop a different military strategy towards the Ituri conflict. Several UPDF commanders offered support to other, non-Hema militias that regularly clashed in resource-rich areas (particularly for the control over gold mines around Mongbwalu) and further complicated the local politico-military landscape. After Ugandan troops in May 2003 eventually withdrew from the DRC, members of the Ugandan regime tried to keep a foot in the door through the creation of additional local proxy forces without being able to control them. 39 Thirdly, while the interconnection between military occupation and economic enterprise in eastern DRC was facilitated by the existence of pre-war transborder trading networks, at the same time it has strongly transformed economic regulation at the UgandanÁCongolese borderland. The Congolese war only further reinforced existing dynamics. It also economically integrated Ituri into regional markets, with an important stake (some argue quasi-monopoly) of Ugandan traders in local Congolese markets. The vast production of commodities such as gold and timber today is fraudulently exported to Uganda, often in compliance with official state representatives on both sides of the border. As elsewhere in Congo's borderlands, these trading activities are subject to constant negotiation between traders, custom agents, security officials and provincial departments.
''Privatised'' networks and the Ugandan state: what happened after the war?
The question remains what the interconnection between military intervention and economic enterprise meant in terms of regime stability and what it tells us about the nature of the Ugandan state. Several arguments have been put forward. One line of reasoning is that the existence of these shadow networks weakened ''the state control over private patronage'' 40 and expressed a redefinition of the nature and form of the Ugandan state, and of its mode of governance and domination. For some observers, the political centre lost control over the UPDF units operating in the DRC. These networks would have gained a high degree of autonomy. Clark suggests that Museveni may have had to retard the withdrawal of troops because of these networks: ''it may even be the case that President Museveni 'negotiated with' his own army in some instances, rather than commanded it, as some evidence suggests''. 41 The personalisation of the Ugandan military as a result of the growing power of different officers through their control over informal networks ''in the field'' may indeed indicate that these Ugandan politico-military entrepreneurs drifted away from the central government. Another theory, however, starts from a regime security argument and suggests that the UPDF intervention in the DRC would have been planned or used to strengthen and enlarge Museveni's support networks on the domestic scene. The mere existence of these networks would have been approved by Museveni himself, with the benefit not necessarily been directed towards the state but to Museveni's supporters and his regime. Rather than a threat of destabilisation, this plunder economy inside of the military should thus be considered as ''functional'' for the political centre.
From these two perspectives, it can be concluded that the relationship between the state and these privatised networks is far from being as clear as it may seem. At the end of the 1990s, there were fears that once these informal networks would go back home, they would threaten Museveni's regime through their autonomisation from the central high military command and that they could potentially ally with the Uganda's political opposition. The increasing autonomy of these informal networks through predation and criminalisation in the DRC indeed induces questions about the future of these networks and their effect on regime stability. Were the UPDF in the DRC becoming a ''corps social guerrier'', built by war and socially reproduced in war 42 and thus a potential source of domestic destabilisation? Or should it be doubted that these entrepreneurs of insecurity really could ''act financially and politically in the international system without interference from the state in which (they are) based?'' 43 For Reno, the violence perpetuated by the UPDF in northern Uganda after the transfer of the troops initially based in the DRC as well as the official decrease in gold exports, induce an increased capacity of informal networks to by-pass the state official economy and show the relative loss of control of the phenomenon by central government. 44 It should be recognised though that these networks did not act without interference from the political centre and (in the longer run) did not fragilise the Ugandan regime (even though it created dissensions within the Ugandan military, among the Historicals themselves but mainly between the Historicals and junior officers). It does illustrate a strong interconnectedness of parallel networks with formal state structures, with the formal centre of power helping to consolidate the power and resources of shadow structures and the same shadow networks being exploited by the political centre.
Rather than becoming a threat to Uganda's political stability, most of the entrepreneurs of insecurity after their return to Uganda have been recycled or reintegrated into the state machinery. Apart from a few arrests and layoffs, the main leaders of the shadow networks who were involved in Congo's resource trade are still in charge of public affairs. Salim Saleh was first recycled as Minister of State for Micro-Finance and later became senior presidential adviser. Kahinda Otafiire was appointed Minister for Local Government, which gave him opportunities to help other veterans from the DRC to acquire plots of land (for example the land bought by Salim Saleh's firm Yaya to build a hotel in Kampala). 45 He then became the minister of Trade and Industry and is currently (January 2012) the minister for Justice and Constitutional Affairs. Col. John Mugyenyi, former commander of a UPDF brigade in eastern Congo, maintained his business activities in Kampala and bought a large part of the Kisekka market via his firm Rhino Investments. As a close ally of Museveni and more especially of Salim Saleh, he contributed to the funding of Museveni's presidential campaign in 2006.
The same goes for a number of prominent Uganda-based businessmen like Sam Engola who closely collaborated with the UPDF during the two Congo wars. As the owner of Showa Trade, a Uganda-registered cargo company transporting military supplies between Entebbe and eastern DRC by order of the Ugandan military authorities, Engola maintained close relationships with key figures in the UPDF during the second Congo war. 46 This enabled him to develop business activities in rebel-held areas, which he supplied with commodities such as salt, soap, cigarettes, fuel and beer, often without paying taxes to the local authorities. 47 Although a UN Panel of Experts accused Engola of having drawn financial benefit from his country's military involvement in the Congo war, the Porter Commission of Inquiry in Kampala concluded that he had not been involved in any illegal activities in the DRC. 48 With his name cleared by the Ugandan judicial authorities, Engola was able to continue his business activities like before. Moreover, as a candidate for Museveni's NRM in the 2011 elections, he managed to win a parliamentary seat for the Erute County South. On 27 May 2011, a little more than three months after the elections, he was appointed Minister for Housing. 49 James Kazini was a clear exception though. Despite strategic mistakes committed by Kazini in Kisangani, he was promoted 50 Muhindo. 53 This three-men commission of inquiry convicted him in March 2008 and sentenced him to a three-year jail term for causing financial loss over creating ghost soldiers in the army pay-roll. 54 This affair seems to prove that Museveni never fully lost control over these entrepreneurs of insecurity. Even more, the arrest of James Kazini was believed to be linked to his political ambitions and not to his role in the shadow economic structure in the DRC.
The end of the Congolese war did not preclude the perpetuation of these militarised actors in their involvement in and control over transborder informal trading networks. A November 2009 report to the United Nations Security Council disclosed again the existence in Uganda of private networks involved in the smuggling of gold and other commodities from the DRC. 55 The recorded and unrecorded mineral trade from Ituri and North Kivu is still passing partly through Uganda where there is no tax issued on exports. And even though UPDF commanders pulled out from the extracting sector to the profit of Congolese gold traders, the Ugandan military is definitely still involved in the commercialisation of gold once arriving in Entebbe. 56 Finally, recent developments in Uganda's oil sector have fuelled speculations about the survival of the aforementioned militarised shadow networks in this emerging profitable sector.
Secrecy, intrigue and turmoil in Uganda's oil sector
Since 2006, prominent members of Uganda's political and military elite have been keeping close control over evolutions in the country's nascent oil industry. This has manifested itself in the fact that the negotiations on the contracts with international oil companies have been taking place in an atmosphere of utmost secrecy, while the responsibility for guarding Uganda's oil assets has been given to a special unit within the UPDF and a private security company led by close family members of Museveni. The secretiveness surrounding the oil deals has sparked off rumours that the President is using Uganda's oil wealth to grease the wheels of patronage and to secure the survival of old shadow networks. Whether these rumours are true or not remains to be seen, but they definitely have a significant impact on Ugandan politics and regime stability. Political opponents of Museveni are using the oil imbroglio as an opportunity to question the legitimacy and credibility of the government, to demand a stronger and more effective anti-corruption policy, and to insist on the need for better democratic oversight of the use of Uganda's natural resources.
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Oil exploration and exploitation are not entirely new in Uganda. The first recording of oil occurrence in the Lake Albert Rift basin, situated on the border between Uganda and the DRC, dates back to the early 1920s. Yet, after the drilling of the first deep oil well by Shell Oil in 1938, the development of Uganda's oil industry came to a standstill due to the eruption of the Second World War, the political instability of the 1950s and 1960s, and the bad investment climate during the rule of Idi Amin. It was not until Museveni's assumption of power in 1986 that the Ugandan government became genuinely interested in capitalising on the country's oil wealth. A group of approximately 100 students was sent overseas to follow training in geology, and considerable efforts were made to gather data on Uganda's oil reserves. Thanks to aerial surveys conducted in the 1980s and magnetic surveys carried out in the 1990s, the Ugandan authorities were able to divide the Ugandan side of Albert Graben 58 into different exploration zones. In 2003Á04, oil exploration gained momentum and, today, several international oil companies are competing for the best pieces of the pie. 59 It is estimated that, by mid-2009, companies had spent more than $700 million on oil exploration in the region. 60 Tensions associated with the competition for Uganda's oil reserves came to the surface in August and September 2007, when a number of violent clashes took place between units of the Ugandan and Congolese armies along the international border that runs through the middle of Lake Albert. On 3 August 2007, there was a heavy exchange of fire between, on the one hand, three patrol boats filled with Congolese soldiers and, on the other hand, one boat filled with UPDF guards and employees of the private security company Saracen, who were guarding an oil exploration barge belonging to the company Heritage Oil Plc. The incident left at least two people dead: one Congolese soldier and one British national working for Heritage. 61 On 24 September 2007, another military clash occurred, which involved Á once again Á an oil vessel belonging to Heritage Oil Plc and two groups of patrol boats respectively manned by Congolese and Ugandan soldiers. The direct cause of the latter incident was the interception of Heritage's oil boat by MONUC, the UN peacekeeping mission in Congo. Claiming that the Heritage boat had illegally crossed into Congolese waters (an allegation denied by Heritage), MONUC escorted it to the Kasenyi landing site, arrested its four crew members and interrogated them for several hours before releasing them again. In the meantime, UPDF had sent out a rescue mission, which engaged in a gunfight with Congolese soldiers in the middle of Lake Albert, a clash that left several people injured and one Congolese soldier dead. 62 These incidents illustrate how the newly discovered oil wealth around Lake Albert gave rise to a fierce border dispute between Congo and Uganda. In addition to this, they also point at the role of the UPDF in the protection of Uganda's oil assets, which, according to the Ugandan government, are of vital importance for the country's development. Museveni even decided to charge the Presidential Guard Brigade (PGB), a special unit in the UPDF, with the task of securing the oil areas. 63 This is remarkable, because the PGB is led by Muhoozi Kainerugaba, Museveni's first-born son whom the UN believes to have taken part in the illicit trade of Congolese natural resources during the war. 64 Equally striking is the fact that Saracen, the private security company responsible for guarding the installations and personnel of Heritage Oil Plc at the time of the incidents on Lake Albert, is associated with Museveni's half-brother Salim Saleh, another prominent member of the militarised shadow networks operational during the war. 65 In 2002, a UN Panel of Experts accused Saleh and his company Saracen of supporting a paramilitary group in north-eastern DRC. 66 Moreover, Saracen Uganda is known to be an offshoot of Saracen International, a company registered in South Africa and formed with the remnants of the infamous private mercenary firm Executive Outcomes.
Uganda's political opposition has sharply criticised the involvement of members of Museveni's inner circle in the oil sector. 67 Another point of criticism concerns the opacity of the Ugandan oil sector in general. Not only is a special permission needed to visit the oil sites and talk to local authorities, farmers and herders in the oil-rich areas, but Ugandan NGOs operating in the area also have great difficulties obtaining research permits. Furthermore, there is a lot of frustration about the lack of transparency about the so-called Production Sharing Agreements (PSA) that set the agreement about the distribution of the resources extracted among public and private actors. 68 The Ugandan government has repeatedly refused to disclose information about the PSA on the grounds that this would weaken its negotiation position vis-à-vis oil exploration companies in the future.
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The debate on the development of Uganda's oil sector came to a head in October 2011, when Gerald Karuhanga, a western Uganda Youth MP, accused three top ministers and close allies of Museveni of having accepted bribes from the international oil company Tullow Oil. 70 Karuhanga's accusations have had farreaching political consequences. First, a majority in the Ugandan parliament, composed of MPs across the political spectrum, has passed a resolution demanding that a moratorium be placed on the execution of all oil contracts and transactions until the putting in place of proper transparency and accountability laws. In addition to this, it has also asked for an independent investigation into the oil bribery scandal. During a party caucus at the end of October 2011, however, the NRM have decided to overrule the parliamentary resolution, announcing the continuation of the oil deals. 71 Both the acceptance of the parliamentary resolution across party lines and its subsequent overturning by the NRM have struck observers of Ugandan politics as highly unusual and indicative of regime instability. While, on the one hand, it is clear that many politicians, including members of the ruling party, want to have a greater say about how Uganda's oil resources should be managed, on the other hand, it is also obvious that Museveni and his closest allies will not easily give up their firm control over the oil sector. Second, Karahunga's oil bribery allegations have laid bare the existence of internal rivalries and power struggles within the NRM. The most spectacular indication of this is that, in the beginning of January 2012, Museveni informed the Central Executive Committee of the NRM of his decision to investigate the possible involvement of Kahinda Otafiire in making fake oil bribery documents and passing them on to Karahunga, presumably with the intention of attacking some of his political rivals in the government, 72 As already explained earlier on in this article, Otafiire is a former member of the militarised shadow networks that orchestrated the illegal exploitation of natural resources during the Congo war. Although, in the past, he was considered a personal friend of Museveni, 73 it now seems as if he has fallen from grace and is no longer enjoying personal protection from the President.
The opaque nature of Uganda's oil sector makes it impossible to make strong statements about the role played by former members of militarised shadow networks such as Muhoozi Kainerugabe, Salim Saleh and Kahinda Otafiire. Nevertheless, it is clear that, just like in the days of the Congo wars, the decisions concerning the management of natural resource wealth are taken by a small group of strongmen close to Museveni. Given the lax manner in which the Ugandan government has dealt with the large amount of evidence concerning the involvement of members of the political and military elite in the illegal exploitation of natural resources in the DRC, it is not really surprising that, in the eyes of the political opposition, Uganda is bound to fall victim to what is known as the ''resource curse''.
Conclusion
The analysis presented in this paper illustrates that Uganda's military involvement in the Congolese wars was not only guided by greed and private ambitions of UPDF commanders. Even if it has been argued that shadow networks under control of these commanders have posed a considerable threat to regime and state stability in Uganda, this article illustrates how activities of Ugandan military entrepreneurs and those networks under their control became an integral part of Uganda's governance regime.
From this analysis, three further conclusions can be drawn. Firstly, borderlands have played a crucial role in the development of military entrepreneurialism. The historicisation of this largely informal transborder entrepreneurialism shows that the networks on which it relies, have not been created ex nihilo. These networks do represent much more than external parasitic structures, and are deeply embedded in transaction and negotiation processes with local actors. These actors develop and interact in a specific and pre-existing local and economic context of the borderland, which limits, frames and sometimes mortgages their capacity of reproduction as much as these very networks impact on the existing exchange structures. This case study thus reveals that because they are providing ''an institutional vacuum for the unfolding of social processes'', 74 borderlands can be understood as regions of inventiveness, having their own social dynamics and historical developments and creating their own institutional arrangements and regulatory regimes. This illustrates the highly informal character of economic and social exchanges in these areas that often are beyond the reach of the central state.
Secondly, while during the Congolese conflict, these networks underwent a process of transformation, they pre-existed the war and perpetuated after the war. Neither do these networks necessarily provoke a further fragmentation of the Ugandan state. Those controlling these networks have developed private interests and (or even because) they are connected to the central state. These military shadow networks could not flourish without links to the state machinery. The established interactions, interlocking and straddling between shadow networks and the political centre call into question the differentiated nature of the central state and the ''so-called'' private networks.
Finally, rather than including an often suggested ''privatisation of the state'', 75 these processes are characterised by more indirect forms of political control, that drive ''the middle-ground between formal and informal, state and non-state spheres of authority and regulation'' at the margins of both the Ugandan and the Congolese state. 76 The threat of seeing a brutalisation of the military and the development of autonomous ''warlords'' within the Ugandan state (as was suggested by Prunier, Reno and others) never materialised. Rather, as demonstrated by our discussion of recent developments in Uganda's oil sector, the continuing straddling of public and private functions helped these entrepreneurs of insecurity to face the transformation of their environment once they left the DRC. By simultaneously keeping one foot in the ''bush and border'' 77 and another in the state bureaucracy and national economy, they could thus both consolidate their private economic interests and serve the political centre.
Notes

